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I. INTRODUCTION
In Harris v. Bekins Van Lines,' the United States District Court for the
District of Kansas upheld an employer's use of a seniority system
embodied in the collective bargaining agreement.2  This agreement
governed the relationship between the employer and the union representing
the employees.3 The seniority system used two components to measure the
respective seniority rights of workers in layoff situations: (1) date-of-
service seniority, and (2) possession of a chauffeur's license.4 The
employer then used the seniority calculation to identify the employees to be
laid off.5 As the white employee, unlike the minority worker, possessed a
chauffeur's license, he was retained, although employed with the company
for a shorter period of time.6 The court concluded that the employer's
seniority determination did not violate § 2000e-2(a) of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. 7 In reaching this conclusion, the district court relied upon the
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1. No. 95-2384-GTV, 1996 WL 570194 (D. Kan. Sept. 27, 1996).
2. Id. at *2.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at *2-*3.
7. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
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special protection granted to seniority systems under Title VII. 8 Specific-
ally, in analyzing an adverse impact claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must
prove that the employer adopted the seniority system with the intent to
discriminate against the plaintiff.9 In adverse impact cases not involving a
seniority system, proof of discriminatory intent is not required to establish
liability. l°
This Note shows that the court's holding in Harris utilizes a rationale
that presents a significant threat to the goals of equal employment. The
Harris analysis demonstrates that seniority systems may present a viable
vehicle for discrimination in the workplace. Selection criteria that typically
would result in employer liability under the equal employment provision of
Title VII may be safeguarded from liability by embedding these criteria in
a seniority system. Moreover, seniority systems that incorporate
discriminatory selection criteria would be more difficult to challenge given
the prevailing judicial policy that imports immunity to seniority systems
absent evidence that their original adoption was motivated by
discriminatory intentions. Finally, this Note maintains that the use of selec-
tion criteria to measure seniority is fundamentally flawed because: (1) it is
in conflict with limitations that the Supreme Court has established for
determining a bona fide seniority system; and (2) it is in conflict with
commonly accepted industrial relations principles defining seniority.
Therefore, selection criteria do not merit the immunity typically granted by
the courts to bona fide seniority systems.
II. BACKGROUND
Section 2000e-2(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states:
Employer Practice
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.1
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2000).
9. Lorance v. AT & T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 905 (1989).
10. See infra Part II-A.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
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The equal employment provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 ("Title VII") was enacted with the goal of assuring equality of
employment opportunities through the termination of "practices and de-
vices that discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin, in an effort to open employment opportunities for African
Americans in occupations which had been traditionally closed to them."' 2
Prior to the enactment of Title VII, many African Americans were
employed in unskilled jobs.13 Technological advances decreased the num-
ber of unskilled jobs in these industries.' 4 In the years leading up to the
enactment of Title VII, African Americans experienced increased
difficulties in the labor market.' 5 "[I]n 1947 the nonwhite unemployment
rate was only 64% higher than the white rate, while in 1962 it was 124%
higher.' 6 Through enactment of Title VII, Congress aimed to create new
job opportunities for African Americans in industries from which they
previously were excluded.' 7  Congress believed this was necessary to
achieve the primary goal of the Civil Rights Act-"the integration of
African Americans into the mainstream of American society."'"
A. General Analytical Framework ofAdverse Impact Cases-Griggs v.
Duke Power Co.
In the seminal adverse impact case, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 9 the
Supreme Court recognized the adverse impact theory of liability under
Title VII. Prior to July 2, 1965, the effective date of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, Duke Power Company adhered to a discriminatory hiring policy at
its Dan River plant.20 The plant was broken down into five operating de-
21partments. Of the plant's five operating departments (Labor, Coal
Handling, Operations, Maintenance, and Laboratory and Test), African
Americans were hired only for the Labor Department.22 The highest paying
jobs in the Labor Department paid less than the lowest paying jobs in any
of the other four departments.23 In 1955, a requirement of a high school
12. Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Title VII Race or National Origin Discrimination in
Employment-Supreme Court Cases, 182 A.L.R. FED. 61 (2002).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
20. Id. at 426-27.
21. Id. at 427.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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education became mandatory for initial assignment to all departments,
excluding Labor, and for transfer from Coal Handling to Operations,
Maintenance, or Laboratory.24 After the Civil Rights Act of 1964 became
effective, Duke Power required minimum scores on two professionally
prepared aptitude tests, in addition to a high school education, in order to
obtain placement in any department, excluding the Labor Department.25
The Court found that these criteria had an adverse effect on the
employment opportunities of minorities.26 This adverse effect was, in part,
the result of differing graduation rates between white males and minorities
at this time in North Carolina. Census data shows that while thirty-four
percent of all white males had a high school diploma, only twelve percent
of minorities graduated high school.27 Further evidence of adverse impact
is found in EEOC records. These records indicate that "while [fifty-eight]
percent of whites passed these tests, only six percent of minorities did.,
28
The Court went on to find that "[n]either [test] was directed or intended to
measure the ability to learn to perform a particular job or category of
jobs. 29
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, addressed the issue of
[W]hether an employer is prohibited by . . . Title VII[] from
requiring a high school education or passing of a standardized
general intelligence test as a condition of employment in or
transfer to jobs when (a) neither standard is shown to be
significantly related to successful job performance, (b) both
requirements operate to disqualify Negroes at a substantially
higher rate than white applicants, and (c) the jobs in question
have formerly been filled only by white employees as part of a
longstanding practice of giving preference to whites.3"
Griggs states that "[u]nder the Act, practices, procedures, or tests
neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be
maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory
employment practices."31  The Court reemphasized this point in com-
menting, "good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem
employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in
headwinds' . . . Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences
24. Id.
25. Id. at 427-28.
26. Id. at 430. See also BENJAMIN WOLKINSON & RICHARD BLOCK, EMPLOYMENT LAW:
THE WORKPLACE RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES AND EMPLOYERS 28 (1996).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 29.
29. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 428.
30. Id. at 425-26.
31. Id. at430.
HARRIS V. BEKINS VAN LINES
of employment practices, not simply the motivation. 3 2  Note that, in
adverse impact cases, discriminatory intent is not required for the
establishment of liability.
Griggs, coupled with Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody,33 and § 2000e-
2(k)34 work to establish a three-step process for analyzing liability in
adverse impact cases.3" Step one in this analytical framework requires that
the plaintiff prove a prima facie case of adverse impact.3 6 In proving a
prima facie case, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the
employment practice causes a significantly disproportionate exclusionary
impact.37  Secondly, assuming a prima facie case is established, the
employer may defend on the grounds that "the challenged practice is job
related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity."38  The business necessity defense requires a balancing of
interests. The interests being balanced are the employer's need for the rule
in question and the societal harm inflicted by the disparate impact created
by the rule.39 Finally, "[e]ven if the employer demonstrates a selection
device to be job related and consistent with business necessity, a plaintiff
may prove unlawful discrimination simply by showing the existence of 'an
alternative employment practice [with a lesser adverse impact that the
employer] refuses to adopt."'4°
This three-step analysis is the generic process used to evaluate a claim
of adverse impact under Title VII. As Wolkinson and Block articulate,
four primary principles emerge from Griggs. First, Title VII does not
require "an employer to employ individuals who lack the requisite
qualifications to fill a job."' Secondly, "[t]ests could be used and raise no
Title VII issue as long as they had no disparate impact upon protected class
workers., 42 Third, "[t]ests which have a disparate impact are subject to
challenge, but might be used if they were proven to be job related.
4 3
Finally, "[t]o prove disparate impact, charging parties need not demonstrate
32. Id. at 432.
33. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000).
35. BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 86-
113 (3d ed. 1996).
36. See id. at 88-94.
37. Id. at 89.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2002).
39. STEPHEN N. SHULMAN & CHARLES F. ABERNATHY, THE LAW OF EQUAL EMPLOY-
MENT OPPORTUNITY 2.05[1] (1990).
40. LrNDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 35, at 111 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k)(1)(A)(ii) (2002) (alteration in original)).
41. WOLKINSON &BLOCK, supra note 26, at 29.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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that the employer was motivated by the intent to discriminate."4 4 By
focusing on the consequences of employer practices, the evidentiary burden
required to prove discrimination was reduced, thus allowing employees to
more easily challenge and overturn employer selection policies. 45 As a
result, Griggs acts to restrain the use of discriminatory selection criteria by
employers.
B. Framework For Analyzing Title VII Claims Implicating Seniority
Systems
Seniority systems have a long history in the United States and many
rights within the workplace are often determined by seniority. 46  A
sampling of such rights includes vacation time, pension benefits, promo-
tion, and firing.47 Due to the importance and far-reaching influence of
seniority rights, Congress sought to ensure that "the passage of Title VII
would not unduly impinge upon those rights. 48
This congressional concern becomes clear upon reviewing the
legislative history of § 2000e-2(h). In International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States,49 the Supreme Court examined the legislative'
history of § 2000e-2(h)5 0 Prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, critics voiced concern that its adoption would be destructive of
existing seniority rights.51 In response to these concerns, supporters of
Title VII and the Justice Department asserted that even in those instances
where the employer has previously engaged in discrimination prior to the
passage of Title VII, those established seniority rights would not be
impacted.52 The Court in Teamsters wrote:
[T]he unmistakable purpose of § 703(h) [§ 2000e-2(h)] was to
make clear that the routine application of a bona fide seniority
system would not be unlawful under Title VII.... [T]his was the
intended result even where the employer's pre-Act discrimination
resulted in whites having greater existing seniority than Negroes.
... To be sure, § 703(h) [§ 2000e-2(h)] does not immunize all
seniority systems. It refers only to "bona fide" systems, and a
proviso requires that any differences in treatment not be "the
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 35, at 51.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 52.
49. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
50. Id. at 350-53.
51. Id. at350.
52. Id.
HARRIS V. BEKINS VAN LINES
",53result of an intention to discriminate because of race ....
In order to guard against these concerns, seniority systems are granted
special protection under Title VII, § 2000e-2(h).54 Therefore, seniority
systems are not analyzed under the Griggs framework. A significant
distinction between the Griggs analysis and the analytical framework used
when seniority systems are at issue is the requirement of discriminatory
intent. As previously stated, the Griggs analysis does not require
discriminatory intent in order to find liability in adverse impact cases.
55
Comparatively, in Teamsters, the Court articulated the bona fide seniority
system defense. "The Supreme Court held that, absent a showing of
specific discriminatory intent, § 703(h) provides a defense even where
adverse impact results. 56 In Lorance v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., the
Supreme Court said, "'absent a discriminatory purpose, the operation of a
seniority system cannot be an unlawful practice even if the system has
some discriminatory consequences."'
5 7
Two questions emerge from these court decisions. First, what
constitutes a seniority system? Second, if a seniority system is deemed to
exist, how does one determine if it is a bona fide seniority system, thus
entitling it to the increased protection provided by § 2000e-2(h)?
"Seniority system" is not a defined term in Title VII.5 8 In California
Brewers Ass 'n v. Bryant,59 the Supreme Court said that
[a] "seniority system" is a scheme that, alone or in tandem with
non-"seniority" criteria, allots to employees ever improving
employment rights and benefits as their relative lengths of
pertinent employment increase. . . . [T]he principal feature of
any and every "seniority system" is that preferential treatment is
dispensed on the basis of some measure of time served in
53. Id. at 352-53.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2002) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of
compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system ... provided that such differ-
ences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin ....
Id.
55. See supra Part II-A.
56. L1NDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 35, at 54 (citing Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v.
U.S., 431 U.S. 324 (1977)).
57. Lorance, 490 U.S. at 904 (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S.
63, 82 (1977)).
58. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2002).
59. California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598 (1980).
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employment.60
The fact that no bright line test exists for determining whether a certain
scheme may be properly labeled a seniority system was not lost on the
Supreme Court. In California Brewers Ass 'n, the Court acknowledged that
"[s]eniority systems, reflecting as they do, not only the give and take of
free collective bargaining, but also the specific characteristics of a par-
ticular business or industry, inevitably come in all sizes and shapes., 61 The
Court then proceeded to state:
In order for any seniority system to operate at all, it has to
contain ancillary rules that accomplish certain necessary
functions, but which may not themselves be directly related to
length of employment . . . . Rules that serve these necessary
purposes do not fall outside § 703(h) [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)]
simply because they do not, in and of themselves, operate on the
basis of some factor involving the passage of time.62
The breadth of the Court's statement demonstrates the broad immunity that
is granted to seniority systems under Title VII.
If an employment scheme is deemed to be a seniority system under the
Court's ambiguous definition, it does not automatically ensure that the
scheme will be granted the protection provided by § 2000e-2(h). In order
to receive such protection, the seniority system must be bona fide-"it
must not be adopted or operated with a discriminatory intent., 63 The
plaintiff bears the burden of proving that a seniority system is not bona
fide.64 The Supreme Court in Teamsters provided that a determination of
discriminatory intent requires evaluation of the "totality of the
circumstances., 65  Though it is not an all-inclusive list of factors to be
evaluated in making such a determination of discriminatory intent, in
James v. Stockham Valves & Fitting Co.,66 the Fifth Circuit established a
four-factor test to guide the analysis. These factors include:
1. whether the seniority system operates to discourage all
employees equally... ;
2. whether the seniority units are in the same or separate
bargaining units (if the latter, whether that structure is rational
and in conformance with industry practice);
3. whether the seniority system had its genesis in racial discrimi-
nation; and
60. Id. at 605-06.
61. Id. at 608.
62. Id. at 607.
63. LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 35, at 60.
64. Id. at61.
65. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 352.
66. 559 F.2d 310 (1977).
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4. whether the system was negotiated and has been maintained
free from any illegal purpose.
Only if the seniority system is determined to be bona fide will it qualify for
the protections granted by § 2000e-2(h).68
C. Selection Procedures
Employers often rely upon selection procedures in managing their
workforce. The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures
("Uniform Guidelines") adopted by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") define the term "selection procedure" as "[a]ny
measure, combination of measures, or procedure used as a basis for any
employment decision. Selection procedures include . . . assessment
techniques from traditional pencil and paper tests, performance tests,
training programs, or probationary periods and physical, educational, and
work experience requirements through informal or casual interviews and
unscored application forms. 69  The Uniform Guidelines define
"employment decisions" to include, but not be limited to, "hiring,
promotion, demotion, membership... referral, retention, and licensing and
certification .... Other selection decisions . . . may also be considered
employment decisions if they lead to any of the decisions listed [in the
definition of selection procedure]."7 °
Assuming a selection procedure is facially neutral and applied in a
constant manner across classes covered by Title VII, it should be analyzed
under the process articulated in Griggs (described above).7 The EEOC
guidelines and Supreme Court doctrine make it apparent that factors used
by employers to measure a worker's ability and fitness are considered
selection criteria. Hence, Griggs should be applied to such factors.
Significantly, courts have applied this same judicial approach to licensing
requirements. The results in cases challenging license requirements have
been mixed.72 As is often the case under the Griggs analysis, the results
turn on whether the license requirement was inherently job related.
EEOC v. Local 14, International Union of Operating Engineers73 is an
example of a court finding a licensing requirement to be in violation of
67. Id. at 352.
68. See LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 35, at 62-65 (discussing implementation
of these four factors).
69. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.16(Q) (2005).
70. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.2(B) (2005).
71. See supra Part II-A (presenting the Griggs fiamework for analyzing an adverse
impact claim under Title VII).
72. See LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 35, at 184-85.
73. 553 F.2d 251 (2nd Cir. 1977).
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Title VII. Local 14 and ten contractors associations with which the local
negotiated collective bargaining agreements were charged with
discriminating against non-whites and Spanish surnamed workers.74 Local
14's members operated machinery in building and construction work.75
The membership of Local 14 was historically white, and as of 1974, only
2.8% of its members were minorities.76 The district court found that the
"labor pool for operating engineers in New York City consisted primarily
of males living in the City who have a high school education or less; that
the black percentage of this pool was 20.76% and the percentage for
Spanish surnamed males was 15.63%," totaling 36.39% for the group.77
Local 14 argued that this disparity was the result of job related membership
admission requirements that included: a New York City Hoist Operator's
license, the ability to operate more than one piece of equipment, and 200
days' worth of experience." The appeals court held that such requirements
were not justifiable on the basis of business necessity. 9 This determination
was based upon the finding that a city license was not required for a worker
to earn a living as an operating engineer.80 That the licensing requirement
was not a business necessity was demonstrated by the fact that many union
members allowed their licenses to lapse.8' The license requirement worked
to disproportionately exclude minorities from Local 14 because few
minority members of the labor pool possessed such licenses.8 2 For this
reason, the license requirement was found to be in violation of Title VII.
III. DISCUSSION-HARRS V. BEKINS VAN LINES
A. Facts
Harris v. Bekins Van Lines involved an allegation that Bekins Van
Lines ("Bekins"), a company engaged in interstate movement and storage,
violated 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).83 Bekins had six drivers, packers, and
helpers working at its Kansas City facility who were represented by the
Teamsters Union. 4 The collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") in place
during the time period at issue provided that seniority determined the order
74. Id. at 253.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 254.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 256.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. No. 95-2384-GTV, 1996 WL 570194 at *1 (D. Kan. Sept. 27, 1996).
84. Id. at *2.
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in which employees would be laid off.85 As a result of economic decline,
Bekins reduced the number of drivers, packers, and helpers at the Kansas
City facility by laying off all but three of its drivers, packers, and helpers.86
As required by the CBA, Bekins used two criteria to calculate each
employee's seniority: (1) actual date-of-service seniority; and (2)
possession of a chauffeur's license.87 This calculation resulted in Harris, a
black male, being ranked fourth in seniority among the employees,
although he had greater date-of-service seniority than the white employee
who was ranked third.88 The white employee was hired three months after
Harris but was ranked higher than Harris because he, but not Harris,
possessed a chauffeur's license.89 Following the layoff, Harris filed a Title
VII claim contending that he was discriminated against on the basis of race.
B. The Harris Court's Analysis
The parties agreed that Bekins used a nondiscriminatory, bona fide
seniority system in determining which employees to lay off.90 Based on
this finding, the court held that Bekins was entitled to summary judgment.9'
The court applied Griggs v. Duke Power Co.92 in reaching this conclusion.93
The court acknowledged that pursuant to Griggs, Title VII prohibits
"practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.,
94
However, the court ruled that the fact pattern presented in Harris fell
outside of the Griggs analysis because it involved a bona fide seniority
system which is granted special protection under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). 95
The court also cited Lorance v. AT & T Technologies, Inc. ,96 noting that
"[f]or liability to inure to defendant, plaintiff must prove that defendant
adopted the seniority system with the intent to discriminate against
plaintiff."97
Once the court presented this legal framework, it quickly disposed of
Harris' claim. 98 Harris never asserted that the seniority system in place at
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. ld.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at *3.
91. Id.
92. 401 US. 424 (1971).
93. Harris, 1996 WL 570194, at *2.
94. Id (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431).
95. Id.
96. 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
97. Harris, 1996 WL 570194, at *2 (quoting Lorance, 490 U.S. at 905).
98. Id. at *3.
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the time of the layoff failed to meet the requirements of a bona fide system
or that the seniority system's implementation was motivated by a
discriminatory purpose.99 The court determined that Bekins properly fol-
lowed the established bona fide seniority system in determining employee
layoffs.' ° Thus, Bekins properly laid off Harris because his lack of a
chauffeur's license resulted in his possession of less seniority than the
white employee who was retained. The court noted that under these
circumstances, laying off the white employee with less service time than
Harris would have violated the CBA and put the bona fide character of the
CBA in jeopardy.'0 ' Based upon this analysis, the court granted Bekins'
motion for summary judgment.
0 2
IV. THE APPLICATION OF SENIORITY IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
The Harris court's analysis of Bekins' seniority system merits
rejection because it is inconsistent with industrial relations approaches to
seniority. In the employment realm, "seniority" refers to length of
service.' '3  One of the functions served by seniority is that it limits
management discretion in employment decisions.' °4 Employers typically
oppose seniority provisions in order to exercise maximum flexibility in
employment decisions.'0 5 Conversely, unions support seniority clauses to
prevent employee favoritism and to protect the job security of workers with
the most years of service in the organization. 0 6 Most CBAs attempt to
balance these management and union concerns by requiring that the
employer consider both seniority and employee qualifications when
making employment decisions. 107 These provisions are commonly called
modified seniority clauses and can be broken down into three categories:
1. "relative ability" clauses, which state that the senior employee
will be given preference if he possesses qualifications equal to
that of junior employees;
2. "sufficient ability" clauses, wherein preference is given to the
senior employee provided he is qualified for the job; and
3. "hybrid" clauses, which require only that the employer give
consideration to both seniority and qualifications, without
99. Id. at *3.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. LAURA J. COOPER ET AL., ADR IN THE WORKPLACE 338 (2000).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 351.
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indicating the relative weight to be accorded these factors.10 8
The importance of seniority in employment can be understood by
examining promotion clauses in CBAs. In seventy-two percent of
contracts, seniority is given a role in determining promotions.'0 9 Seniority
acts as the sole factor in promotions in five percent of contracts."' In forty
percent of CBAs seniority is the determining factor assuming the job
applicant meets the .minimum qualifications.'1 ' Seniority is a secondary
factor in twenty-four percent of such contracts." 2 In such contracts the
employer can bypass the more senior employee if the worker selected by
management possesses less seniority but is more qualified. Finally,
seniority is granted equal consideration with other factors in determining
promotion in two percent of contracts.' 13
These CBAs demonstrate that seniority and measurements of ability
are two distinct phenomena. Ability measurements are not considered part
of seniority. Both the courts and the parties negotiating seniority clauses
routinely treat seniority and qualification measurements as distinct notions.
By treating a qualification measurement, such as a chauffeur's license, as
part of the seniority clause, the Harris court misapplied industry practices
regarding seniority. In addition to being unreasonable, the Harris court's
approach in analyzing such a hybrid contract clause is dangerous because,
as will be examined below, it would allow employers to circumvent Griggs
through the adoption of seniority clauses that contain selection criteria that
may restrict minority employment opportunities.
V. THE THREAT TO EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY POSED BY THE
HARRIS DECISION
Due to the special protection granted to seniority systems under Title
VII, seniority systems present a possible vehicle through which employers
may implement discriminatory mechanisms negatively impacting minority
employment. This threat arises from the fact that non-validated selection
criteria having a disparate impact, when embedded within a seniority
system, would no longer be subject to scrutiny under the Griggs frame-
work. Furthermore, when implemented through a seniority system, such
discriminatory selection criteria could only be proven unlawful if the
plaintiff were able to demonstrate a discriminatory intent. Such a showing
108. Id.
109. THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 75
(10th ed. 1983).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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is very unlikely given the difficulty of establishing direct evidence of
employment discrimination. Yet, such evidence would be necessary in
view of the prevailing judicial policy that seniority systems are lawful
absent evidence of a hostile discriminatory intent.
This threat to equal employment opportunity was explicitly
recognized by the Supreme Court in California Brewers Ass 'n v. Bryant. 1
4
In California Brewers Ass 'n, the Court indicated that employers are not to
evade Title VII by embedding discriminatory selection criteria in a
seniority system.
What has been said does not mean that § 703(h) [42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(h)] is to be given a scope that risks swallowing up Title
VII's otherwise broad prohibition of "practices, procedures, or
tests" that disproportionately affect members of those groups that
the Act protects. Significant freedom must be afforded em-
ployers and unions to create differing seniority systems. But that
freedom must not be allowed to sweep within the ambit of §
703(h) [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)] employment rules that depart
fundamentally from commonly accepted notions concerning the
acceptable contours of a seniority system, simply because those
rules are dubbed "seniority" provisions or have some nexus to an
arrangement that concededly operates on the basis of seniority. 15
The threat warned of in California Brewers Ass' is precisely the
negative outcome that occurred in Harris. In Harris, Bekins incorporated a
licensing requirement into the seniority provision and then proceeded to
use it to measure seniority.1 6 Note, the employer could have substituted
any other selection criteria in the place of the license requirement. For
example, a pencil-and-paper test, an interview, or possession of a college
degree could be embedded into a seniority clause and used to deprive
minority workers of job opportunities. Such an outcome would eviscerate
Griggs, which was designed to outlaw selection criteria having a
disproportionately adverse effect, unless such selection criteria were proven
to be job related.
Furthermore, were the Harris decision to be approved of by higher
level courts, it would be extremely difficult to overturn seniority systems
which have disparate impact given the Supreme Court ruling that seniority
systems are immune from challenge absent evidence that they were
implemented with the intent to discriminate against minorities." 7
Appellate courts have recognized the inherent difficulty in proving an
employer's discriminatory intent. While discussing the difficulty of
114. 444 U.S. 598 (1980).
115. Id. at 608.
116. Harris, 1996 WL 570194, at *2.
117. Lorance v. AT & T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
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proving an employer's discriminatory intent, the Sixth Circuit in Radue v.
Kimberley-Clark Corp. 1 8 wrote, "[d]irect evidence essentially requires an
admission by the decision-maker [employer] that his actions were based on
the prohibited animus."" 9 At the same time, the Radue court recognized
that "most employers are careful not to openly discriminate and certainly
not to publicly admit it."' 2 The Supreme Court has also acknowledged that
the employer will typically have better access to the proof of discrimination
than will the plaintiff.'2' Similarly, in La Montagne v. American Con-
venience Products, Inc.,122 the Seventh Circuit acknowledged the difficulty
in proving an employer's discriminatory intent, because "an employer who
knowingly discriminates .. .may leave no written records revealing the
forbidden motive and may [not] communicate it .... When evidence is in
existence, it is likely to be under the control of the employer, and the
plaintiff may not succeed in turning it up.' ' 123 It is clear that charging
parties confront extreme difficulty in proving that a seniority system was
deliberately implemented with the purpose of discriminating.
VI. RECOMMENDATION-How HARRIS SHOULD HAVE BEEN DECIDED
The Harris court was faced with a distinct seniority clause. As
opposed to treating date-of-service seniority and possession of a
chauffeur's license as comprising a single seniority clause, the court should
have separated these two aspects of the provision and analyzed each
separately.
The requirement of a chauffeur's license is a qualification clause and
not part of seniority. As such, the license qualification should not be
granted the special protection provided to a seniority system under 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). Rather, it should be analyzed under the Griggs
framework.
Within the Griggs framework, Harris is first required to prove a prima
facie case of adverse impact. Harris bore the burden of proving that the
requirement of a chauffeur's license caused a significantly disproportionate
exclusionary impact. Harris failed to establish such a prima facie case.
Harris only alleged that Bekins laid him off while retaining a white
employee with less time of service. 24  This allegation in no way
demonstrated that the requirement of a chauffeur's license caused a
118. 219 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2000).
119. Id. at 616.
120. Id.
121. See Int'l Bhd. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 359 n.45 (1977).
122. 750 F.2d 1405 (7th Cir. 1984).
123. Id. at 1410.
124. Harris. 1996 WL 570194. at *3.
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significantly disproportionate exclusionary impact. This is not to say that
making such a showing was not possible. For example, Harris could have
attempted to demonstrate a disproportionately exclusionary impact by
introducing evidence that fewer African Americans than others possessed a
chauffeur's license at the time of Harris' layoff. Nonetheless, no such
evidence was presented.
Because Harris failed to establish a prima facie claim of dispropor-
tionate exclusionary impact, the court should have determined that there
was no Title VII violation, and as a result, that Bekins was entitled to
summary judgment. Thus, under both the proposed analytical framework
and the framework utilized by the Harris court, a granting of summary
judgment in favor of Bekins is the final result. However, the means by
which this result is achieved is drastically different. By treating the license
requirement as part of the seniority provision, the Harris court incorrectly
applied Supreme Court doctrine and ignored industry practices regarding
seniority. The Harris court's framework in analyzing such a hybrid
contract clause is dangerous because its adoption would allow employers to
circumvent Griggs through the use of seniority clauses incorporating
selection criteria. In comparison, the proposed analytical framework does
not present such a danger and protects the disparate impact doctrine
endorsed by the Supreme Court in Griggs.
VII. CONCLUSION
The decision in Harris is a district court case, and hence, may be of
limited precedential value. However, highly authoritative commentators,
such as Larson, have cited the decision as an example of a seniority system
that withstood legal challenge. Note, when Larson cited Harris, no critical
commentary was provided.125 As such, other courts may mistakenly adopt
Harris. Discerning jurists should understand that the court's approach in
Harris represents a misguided application of Supreme Court decisions on
both seniority systems and selection criteria which, if adopted, would
undermine equal employment opportunity goals.
125. LEx K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 30.02D[2] n.7 (2d ed. 2005).
